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Carmel Shalev* and In Search of Equity and
David Chinitz** Efficiency: Health Care Reform
and Managed Competition
in Israel
Israel's ongoing health reform provides lessons regarding attempts to combine
universal coverage under national health insurance with a version of managed
competition. Based on principles of 'justice, equality and mutual aid," Israel's
National Health Insurance Law, 1994 guarantees access to a broad basket of
basic services to be provided by four competing sick funds, and the availability
of resources adequate to finance the basket. The new rights of citizens to
universal coverage and to move freely among sick funds constituted a major
policy breakthrough. However, successive amendments to the Law reflect
continuing controversy over the amount of resources required to finance the
basic basket. Despite the intention to base the system on decentralization and
competition, successive amendments have placed more control over health
system finance and sick fund management in the hands of the Ministries of
Finance and Health. Updating the basic basket to take account of new
technologies and drugs has raised unresolved dilemmas. In the Israeli case the
dialectic of management vs. competition and of government vs. market,
obscures fundamental issues related to the right of citizens to health services.
The process set in motion by adoption of The National Health Insurance Law,
1994 calls on public managers and politicians to design institutions which can
set priorities within a limited budget and effectively regulate the health care
system.
Des legons peuvent 6tre tirees de la r6forme du systeme de sante en Israel sur
la possibilit6 de combiner le systeme de couverture universelle, en place sous
le r6gime national d'assurance-maladie, et une version de la - concurrence
dirig6e -. Bas6e sur les principes -de justice, d'egalite et d'aide mutuelle, la
Loi isra6lienne sur le r6gime national d'assurance-maladie de 1994 garantit
I'acces 6 une gamme plus 6tendue de services de base, fournis par quatre
fonds comp6titifs destines aux malades. La Loi garantit aussi la disponibilite
des ressources adequates pour financerces services. Les nouveaux droits des
citoyens a une couverture universelle et a la libre mobilitd entre les fonds
destines aux malades ont constitu6 une percee majeure dans I'6laboration des
politiques du gouvernement. Cependant, des amendements subsequents 1 la
Loi refletent la controverse entourant le montant des ressources requis pour
* Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Jerusalem, Israel and Adjunct Professor, Tel Aviv
University Law Faculty.
** Lecturer, Department of Health Management, Economics and Medical Ecology, Hebrew
University-Hadassah School of Public Health, Jerusalem, Israel. The authors are grateful to
two anonymous reviewers as well as to Philip Girard and the editorial board of this journal for
helpful comments. Responsibility rests solely with the authors.
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financer les services de base. Malgr6 Pintention de baser le systome sur le
concept de la docentralisation etde la concurrence, les amendements a la Loi ont
plac plus de pouvoirs entre les mains des Ministores des Finances et de la Sant
pour contr6ler le financement du systome de sant6 et la gestion des fonds
destines aux malades. La mise ajour de la gamme des services debase pour tenir
compte des nouvelles technologies et de nouveaux m6dicaments a soulev6 des
dilemmes qui ne sont pas encore r6solus. En Israel, l'utilisation des mots tels
" direction "par opposition i§ , comp6tition , et , gouvemement " par opposition
, -march6,, embrouille des questions fondamentales reliees au droit d'acc~s
des citoyens aux services de santd. Le processus mis en branle par I'adoption de
la Loi surle r6gime national d'assurance-maladie de 1994 requiert des directeurs
publics et des politiciens la creation d'institutions capables de d6terminer les
prioritds tout en respectant les limites des budgets 6tablis et qui peuvent gdrer
efficacement le systome de santd.
Introduction - Social Justice and Managed Competition
On January 1, 1995 Israel inaugurated a fundamental reform in its health
system when The National Health Insurance Law, 19941 came into
effect. In this paper we review this intended structural change and its
actual implementation, and consider how they reflect fundamental values
entrenched in the Law relating to the right to health care as a matter of
social justice, equality and mutual aid. The National Health Insurance
Law, 1994 constitutes a major component of a bold and comprehensive
health reform. However, it has proven difficult to implement the Law and
the other elements of the reform.
The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 was enacted with a vision
of equity, fairness and universal entitlement as a matter of right in the
health system. At the same time, the Israeli case has some lessons
regarding the introduction of managed, or regulated competition, into the
health system. Israel's reformed system bears a striking resemblance to
models of managed competition recently debated and partially intro-
duced in the United States and other countries, the most prominent being
the Netherlands. A comparison of the theory's implementation in Israel
relative to other systems is instructive. A key question is, to what degree
the two goals of social justice and managed competition are compatible.
Managed competition was the brainchild of Alain Enthoven, an
American health economist .2 Under his proposal, universal health insur-
ance would be provided by health plans competing over both price and
1. 5754 Sefer HaChukim 156.
2. A.C. Enthoven, "The History and Principles of Managed Competition" (1993) 12 Health
Aff. (Supplement) 25. See A.C. Enthoven, Theory and Practice of Managed Competition in
Health Care Finance (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1988).
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quality, subject to rules intended to promote both equity and efficiency.
Such rules include a standardized basket of services, open enrolment in
health plans, community rating of premiums and possibly even regula-
tion of the rate of annual increase of premiums. The rules would be
enforced by what Enthoven called "sponsors," institutional bodies repre-
senting consumers who would provide the latter with information about
health plans and organize them to realize increased purchasing power.
The sponsors would pay a capitation payment to the health plans for each
member enrolled; the consumers would be able to choose among plans
based on quality and any difference in price between the capitation
payment and the actual premium charged by the health plan of their
choice .'
Enthoven's plan has proven too complex for any system to adopt in
full. The United States has patches of managed competition in various
geographic areas, with consumers sponsored primarily by employers.
4
Medicare and Medicaid have introduced programs to encourage, or in
some cases require, their covered populations to enroll in managed care
organizations .' Managed competition has not been introduced in concert
with universal coverage, and sponsorship on the part of employers,
government or any other form of purchasing cooperative, raises difficult
questions of accountability, such as the perception of many that choice is
too limited and that employers focus too much on cost containment.
6
The Netherlands has been attempting to introduce managed competi-
tion for a number of years Sick funds and private insurers are now
required to accept all potential enrollees and they can organize networks
of care by selectively contracting with providers. However, the program
is not universal in that there are still two health insurance schemes in
Holland, a private scheme for those above a certain income level and a
public scheme for those below. The basket of services has been standard-
3. Enthoven, Theory and Practice.
4. J.R. Robinson, "Health Care Purchasing and Market Changes in California" (1995) 14
Health Aff. 117.
5. S.A. Altman, "The Impact of Changing Government and Private Hospital and Physician
Payment Methods in the United States" in D. Chinitz & J. Cohen, eds., Governments and
Health Systems: Implications of Differing Involvements (Chichester: Wiley, forthcoming).
6. J. Kassirer, "Managing Managed Care's Tarnished Image" (1997) 337 New Eng. J. Med.
338.
7. W.W. van de Ven & F. Rutten, "Managed Competition in the Netherlands: Lessons from
Five Years of Health Care Reform" (1994) 17 Aust. Health Rev. 9; A.A. de Roo, "Contracting
and Solidarity: Market Oriented Changes in Dutch Health Insurance Schemes" in Richard B.
Saltman & Casten von Otter, eds., Implementing Planned Markets in Health Care: Balancing
Social and Economic Responsibility (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995).
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ized only for the sick funds working under the public scheme, though,
apparently, most private insurers adopt the public basic basket as a
minimum. The Dutch government has also been slow to place the sick
funds at complete risk for health expenditures, compromising the effi-
ciency incentives of the funds and reducing the salience of any potential
competition over price.8
Of the various examples, Israel comes the closest to Enthoven's plan:
one hundred percent of the population is enrolled by personal choice in
any one of four competing sick funds that provide a standard basket of
services against a capitation payment from earmarked revenues of a
health tax, the premium for which is set by statute. What is missing in the
Israeli system is price competition.9 Nonetheless, it is interesting to
consider what the Israeli case tells one about implementation of managed
competition.
This article describes the problems of the pre-reform Israeli health
system, and then presents the main lines of reform, focusing on the new
National Health Insurance Law, 1994. A review of subsequent amend-
ments to the Law in the two and a half years that have passed since it came
into effect, provides insights into the problems of the implementation
process. A look at court proceedings initiated under the Law brings to the
fore a key question of incorporating the cost of new technology. We
conclude with a discussion of issues posed by the Israeli case likely to be
relevant for other countries engaged in or considering structural overhaul
of their health systems.
I. Background - Problems Calling for Reform
The issue of major structural reform in the health system has been on the
Israeli policy agenda almost since the creation of the State in 1948.1 Over
the years several attempts had been made to enact a law guaranteeing
governmental coverage of comprehensive health services but none
8. A.A. de Roo, personal communication, 9 June 1997.
9. There are at least two possible explanations for the exclusion of price competition in the
Israeli system: (1) the fear of resultant inequities; and (2) concern that health payments would
leak out of the health system (see below, text to footnotes 20 and 48). Enthoven seems to have
dealt with the possible inequities of price competition in theory, but might have found it
difficult to deal with the idiosyncratic realpolitik of the Israeli case. See A.C. Enthoven, "On
the Ideal Market Structure for Third-Party Purchasing of Health Care" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. &
Med. 1413. See D. Chinitz, "Reforming the Israeli Health Care Market" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci.
& Med. 1447.
10. D. Chinitz ,"Israel's Health Policy Breakthrough: The Politics of Reform and the Reform
of Politics" (1995) 20 J. of Health Politics, Policy & Law 909.
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succeeded." In the 1980s, however, dissatisfaction with the existing
system reached a peak. Physicians and other health professionals, dissat-
isfied with nationally negotiated wage levels, conducted intermittent
strikes and work slowdowns. Wage agreements, combined with limited
hospital and community clinic operating budgets, caused facilities to
close in the early afternoon. As a result, queues for certain elective
procedures grew and access to services was believed to be constrained.
A special statutory commission of inquiry was therefore appointed to
examine the issue of reform. The recommendations of the State Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Operation and Efficiency of the Healthcare
System in Israel, known as the Netanyahu Commission, 2 eventually
served as the basis for the scheme enacted in The National Health
Insurance Law, 1994. At the time of its coming into force in 1995, 95%
of the population of about 5.5 million received health insurance coverage
from four non-profit sick funds. 3 Despite this, the system was plagued
by the following persistent problems:
(a) Uninsured populations. Approximately 300,000 persons, includ-
ing seventy thousand children, were not insured with any of the sick
funds. 4 Many of these belonged to the Arab minority and could not
afford sick fund membership dues.
(b) Ambiguity regarding coverage. Each sick fund determined its own
benefits package policy and for the most part there was no written
11. H.S. Halevi, The Bumpy Road to National Health Insurance: The Case of Israel
(Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale Institute, 1980). See also A.Y. Ellencweig, "The New Israeli
Health Care Reform: An Analysis of a National Need" (1983) 8 J. of Health Politics, Policy
& Law 366 and D. Chinitz, "Hiding in the Market Place: Politics and Technocracy in Israeli
Health Policy" in C. Altenstetter & J.W. Bjorkman, eds., Health Policy Reform, National
Variations and Globalization (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
12. State of Israel, Report of the State Commission of Inquiry into the Operation and
Efficiency of the Healthcare System in Israel (Jerusalem, 1990) (hereafter "the Netanyahu
Commission Report").
13. Israeli sick funds are similar to U.S. health maintenance organizations (HMOs), with
Klalit structured as a large full staff model which employs salaried physicians and owns
hospitals, while three smaller funds are more like Independent Practice Associations. Even
before the new law they insured their members on a basis of mutual aid, and were at the same
time active in the actual organization of care and responsible for the provision of a broad range
of health services. The four existing sick funds were officially recognized in the Schedule to
The Parallel Tax Law, 1973, which imposed upon employers a health tax that was distributed
among the sick funds in proportion to the number of their members. The National Health
Insurance Law, 1994 provides in ss. 24 and 25 for the recognition of new sick funds. Criteria
in this regard were set out in The National Health Insurance (Recognition of Sick Funds)
Regulations, 1995, Kovetz Takanot at 134.
14. S. Cohen & R. Steiner, The Health Insurance Law - Background, Principles and
Implementation, (Jerusalem: National Insurance Institute, 1995). This figure represents 5% of
Israel's population. Cf. the Netanyahu Commission Report, at 75.
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guarantee of access to specified services. As a result, not only were there
variations in coverage across the four funds, but the insured could not be
certain that the services they required would be available.,5
(c) Inefficiency. The Israeli health system has traditionally been well
endowed with medical staff and facilities. It typically spent about 7.5%
of its GDP on health care during the 1980s, an amount in line with the
average of OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment) countries. 6 However, methods of budgeting and reimburse-
ment offered at best mixed incentives for efficient performance.17 Fur-
thermore, the Ministry of Health was itself a major provider of services,
being responsible for the delivery of public health services as well as the
owner and operator of many of Israel's general acute care hospitals. The
bifurcation of services between the Ministry and the sick funds presented
problems of continuity of care and efficiency. At the same time, there was
a conflict of interest between the Ministry's role as an impartial policy
maker and implementer for the entire system and its role as a purchaser
and provider of services competing with others within the system.' 8
(d) Inequity. One sign of constrained access in the public and non-
profit sector was increased resort to privately financed care, and the
growth of "black" and "grey" markets in public medicine. 9 These
developments contributed to inequality in access to care. This inequity
was exacerbated by developments in the sick fund market. The largest of
the four sick funds - Klalit - had been established at the beginning of the
century by a workers' union and was still owned by the Histadrut, the
General Labour Federation. Before the new Law it serviced almost 70%
of the population, including most weak socioeconomic groups all over
the country. The three other funds were more selective in their member-
ship, preferring young, healthy and potentially wealthy members living
in central locations. As a result of long-standing ties between the Labour
Federation and the Labour Party, which ruled or shared rule in most
government coalitions, the Klalit sick fund was used to relying on
generous government support but in the late 1980s, government, some-
times led by the more laissez-faire Likud Party, was less willing and able
15. T. Bamea, Benefits Packages of Sick Funds in Israel (Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale
Institute, 1989) (Hebrew).
16. G. Bin Nun & D. Ben Ori, International Comparisons: OECD Countries and Israel
(Israel: Ministry of Health, 1996) at 28.
17. D. Chinitz & B. Rosen, A Tale of Two Markets: Hospital Competition in Israel
(Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale Institute, 1993).
18. Netanyahu Commission Report, at 52-60.
19. D. Chemichovsky & D. Chinitz, "The Political Economy of Healthy System Reform in
Israel" (1995) 4 Health Econ. 127.
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to provide it. The sick fund thus began to lose healthier and wealthier
members to the three smaller funds, creating the perception, and perhaps
the reality, of a two-tiered system.2"
(e) Lack of accountability, especially financial. As noted, the Kialit
sick fund became accustomed to government bailouts when large deficits
accumulated.2" Changes of government and increasing government
austerity did not lead to changes in its financial management. Govern-
ment, including the Ministry of Finance, also seemed to become habitu-
ated to crisis management and financial intervention in the affairs of both
the Klalit fund and the health system more generally. The lack of financial
accountability was also related to the overly centralized nature of the
health system, with government and the management of the largest sick
fund directly involved in the day-to-day activities of far-flung operating
units. Lack of clear boundaries between the organizational centre and
periphery of the system, between the sick fund and the government, and
between the sick fund and the Labour Federation all contributed to the
blurring of lines of accountability.
II. Visions, Politics and Solutions
1. Evolving perceptions of health policy
As the system and the above problems evolved, so too did visions of
policy solutions. Options fluctuated between complete nationalization of
the health system similar to the British National Health Service, and
various versions of streamlining the competition among the sick funds .22
Israeli health policy analysts became aware of trends in other countries
such as regionalization, managed (or regulated) competition, and pur-
chaser-provider split, not to mention universal coverage. Notwithstand-
ing self-addressed warnings to avoid unduly rapid adoption of models
from abroad,23 the main lines of reform which emerged in the early 1990s,
as outlined below, paralleled developments in other countries such as the
U.K. and the Netherlands.
Parallel to the substantive focus on structural reform, the political
implications of health reform were evident. Any reform which threatened
the special relationship between the largest sick fund and the Labour
Federation was viewed with consternation by the latter, and favoured by
political opponents of the Labour Party. This policy linkage, as well as an
20. Netanyahu Commission Report, at 76-7.
21. Chernichovsky & Chinitz, supra note 19.
22. Chinitz, supra note 10.
23. Netanyahu Commission Report, at 45-6.
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overriding concern by government leaders with maintaining coalition
stability in the face of crucial decisions regarding the Arab-Israeli peace
process, should be kept in mind when trying to understand Israeli health
policy.
Another factor motivating reform was the perception of increasing
inequities in the health system, contrary to the commitment to equal
access to high quality health care services which had always been a
component of Israel's socialist policies. Health reform came to be seen as
a matter of social justice and basic rights. For example, as mentioned, one
of the most important forces behind the enactment of the new Law was
an ongoing economic crisis in the Klalit sick fund, which repeatedly
threatened the collapse of the entire public health system. This was
something the government could not afford politically, but neither could
it afford to continue subsidizing the Klalit sick fund as it had before. The
National Health Insurance Law, 1994 was an economic reform that
appeared to answer this predicament, which could be viewed both as
special aid to Klalit but also as striking a blow for social justice in the
health sphere, given the makeup of Klalit's insured population.1
4
Casting the issue in this manner perhaps facilitated the overcoming of
the political obstacles alluded to above, which involved linkages to
policies and interests not strictly within the sphere of the health system.
However, it also masked some of the difficult political issues within the
health system inherent in any reform proposal. By 1994, the time was ripe
for enactment of health reform proposals which reflected the policy
images discussed above, and which would defer confrontation of some
intrinsic health policy dilemmas to the implementation stage."
2. The main lines of reform
The recommendations of the Netanyahu Commission of Inquiry were
published in 1990. Subsequently, the Likud government decided to adopt
a three-pronged health care reform policy, which the Labour Party also
adopted after winning the 1992 elections. The first component was
passage of national health insurance legislation which would address the
24. Interestingly enough, once Parliament concluded the legislative process, intensive
negotiations began between the Ministry of Finance and the Klalit sick fund to settle a debt of
5 billion New Israeli Shekels (approximately U.S. $1.6 billion). The sick fund sold assets and
undertook major labour cutbacks. This was accompanied by a political process of separating
the sick fund from its owner, the Labour Federation, while dismantling a tax collection
bureaucracy seen by some as inefficient,overgrown and redundant. Cf. G. Bin Nun & B. Rosen,
"Passage of Israel's National Health Insurance Law: A Case Study of Major Legislative
Change" (Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale Institute, 1996) [unpublished].
25. Chinitz, supro note 9.
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problems of the uninsured and the inequities in the system.26 Secondly,
government-owned hospitals were to be converted into self-governing
corporations, in order to increase their financial incentives for efficiency
and accountability. Finally, and contingent on the second initiative, the
Ministry of Health would be reorganized to focus not on direct operation
of hospitals and provision of services, but rather on policy planning and
regulation.
Confronted by stiff opposition from labour unions representing hospi-
tal nursing and administrative staff, the second proposal to incorporate
government hospitals has been stymied. 27 This impasse, along with the
usual organizational resistance to change, has meant that the Ministry of
Health has scarcely been reorganized. It is with regard to the first
component of reform, passage of The National Health Insurance Law,
1994, that the breakthrough has occurred, accompanied by unforeseen
problems in implementation.
III. The National Health Insurance Law -
Justice, Equality andMutual Aid
The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 embodies an authentic view of
social justice. It was aimed at solving the equity problems and financial
crises mentioned above. The major principles of the right to health
services under the Law are stated in section 1: "justice, equality and
mutual aid." The drafters of the law sought to ensure universal access to
a clear and comprehensive basket of health benefits and the availability
of adequate financial resources to make such access a reality. However,
26. The proposal of the Likud government was published in the National Health Insurance
Bill, 1992,5752 Hatza 'ot Chok 211. The proposal of the Labour government, which served as
the basis for the subsequent legislation, was published in the National Health Insurance Bill,
1993, 5753 Hatza'ot Chok 204. The two bills differed only in details, e.g., regarding
regionalization as opposed to continuing the existing centralized management of the sick
funds.
27. A. Shirom et al., Incorporation of Public Hospitals in Israel: Assessment of Develop-
ments and Policy Alternatives (Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Social Policy in Israel, 1997)
at 20-21 (Hebrew). On 1 January 1992 five government hospitals were officially registered as
corporations for the public benefit under the Companies [New Version] Ordinance, 1983 and
the Trust Law, 1979. Subsequently the labour federation announced a strike. The government
petitioned the labour court for an injunction against the strike, and succeeded on appeal before
the national labourcourt; 4-17/52 State of Israel v. General Labour Federation et al. 26 P.D.A.
(4) 87. However, according to the cabinet decision on the incorporation of government
hospitals, as well as the articles of association of those that were registered as corporations, any
change in the status of the employees is conditioned on the signing of a collective agreement.
Meanwhile the employees of the hospitals continue to be state employees. Cf. HC 5684/91
Barzilai v. Government ofIsrael etal. 46 P.D. (1) 536 (independent challenge to incorporation
dismissed).
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implementing this combination has proven more difficult than legislating
it. In the following sections we present the fundamental values of the Law
and discuss the amendments enacted since it came into force in January
1995, so as to demonstrate the problems of implementation.
1. Justice - Universal Coverage
The Law extends coverage to all persons resident in Israel, including
those who were previously uninsured. While the Law also imposes an
obligation to pay health taxes, failure to do so may not serve as grounds
for denial of services. As a result, disadvantaged communities, which
previously had high percentages of uninsured, are now completely
covered. In some of the Bedouin towns in the south of Israel, new clinics
have been opened as a result of competition among the sick funds to gain
new members.28
2. Equality - Mandatory Membership
Everyone must register with a sick fund, 29 but this is a formality required
to establish which of the funds is obliged to provide services to the
individual. Furthermore, registration with a sick fund is a matter of
consumer choice, and there is also a right to transfer from one fund to
another. This is a mechanism designed to encourage competition between
the funds in terms of the quality of services.30
Most importantly, the sick fund is under a duty to respect the choice of
the individual. It may no longer be selective in its membership, rejecting
the sick, the elderly or the poor.3' This rule is also supported by an
economic device which allocates revenues between the sick funds
28. Personal communications from the mayors of Rahat and Tel Sheva, August 1996.
29. Before the law, membership in a sick fund was voluntary (if one could afford it); now it
is mandatory. This paternalistic constraint on one's freedom of association is necessary to
ensure equality. The rule of mandatory membership was challenged by a handful of people who
believe in alternative medicine and reject conventional medicine; C. Shalev correspondence
with Ministry of Health, July 1995).
30. It is also a response to the previous situation, where individuals who were members of the
General Labour Federation, or who were employed by companies owned by or affiliated with
it, were automatically members of the Klalit sick fund, and membership dues were deducted
from their salaries without any choice. See, in this context, The National Health Insurance Law,
1994, s. 4(d): "An employer shall not make employment conditional on any condition
whatsoever relating to membership in a particular sick fund, and shall not require an employee
to be registered in a particular sick fund."
31. The Law provides expressly that "a sick fund shall register every resident who chooses
to be registered with it, shall not restrict his registration and shall not make such registration
conditional on any condition or payment whatsoever" (s. 4(c)). Violation of this rule is a
criminal offence, punishable by one year's imprisonment or a fine (s. 47(a)).
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according to a "capitation formula" that compensates for high risk of
illness (i.e., consumption of health services) by an age factor.3 2 In
addition, for a small number of "serious illnesses" (Gaucher, kidney
failure (dialysis), thelassimia and hemophilia), fixed amounts are trans-
ferred directly to the sick funds according to the number of their members
suffering from such illnesses.3 3 It is important to note that these economic
devices leave the sick funds without any control over the budget allocated
to them even though they have a statutory duty to provide the services
included in the basic basket to their members.
3. Equality - the Extent of the Basket
One of the major achievements of the Law, in terms of consumer rights,
was the publication of a list of the basic health services covered by the
scheme. Section 7 defines the basket of basic services, as specified in the
schedules to the Law." The Second Schedule includes a list of the health
services given by the Klalit sick fund before the Law, which was intended
to be a basic basket, allowing sick funds to compete by offering members
additional services, at no extra charge, over and above the minimum
statutory standard.
The Third Schedule to the Law is a list of all the services provided by
the Government, through the Ministry of Health, prior to the Law's
coming into effect: "preventive medicine" (otherwise known as mother
and child services),3 5 geriatric and psychiatric services, and rehabilita-
tion devices .3 6 The Law provided that responsibility for the provision of
all these services would be transferred to the sick funds (over an
undefined period of time) to allow for efficiency in the provision of
services, as well as continuity of care.
4. Mutual Aid - Taxation and Social Exemptions
The Law provides for universal entitlement, on the one hand, while
imposing a progressive health tax on the other. The tax, called a "health
32. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 17.
33. Ibid., s. 19.
34. According to s. 8(f)(1) of the Law, a committee of experts was given two years to further
specify the scope of services, in terms of "the waiting period for a service, the distance from
the insured's home within which the service is given, the entity that decides upon giving the
service, the manner of its provision and its quality." Although such a committee was convened,
it has not yet published any conclusions.
35. These services include primarily prenatal care, monitoring for early detection of congeni-
tal defects and illness, immunization and child development monitoring. There is an annual
copayment fee of approximately U. S. $40 per family.
36. E.g., wheel chairs, hearing aids, artificial limbs.
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insurance fee," is payable in the amount of 4.8% of one's taxable income,
up to a ceiling of approximately U.S. $250 per month. Children and
housewives are exempt from the tax. Under the previous system, sick
fund membership fees were charged per family unit. The Law, however,
regards the individual as the taxation unit. The result is that families in
which both spouses work are paying more for health insurance than
before. There are several exemptions on "social" grounds. Unemployed
and elderly persons pay a minimal sum in health insurance fees, set by the
Law,37 of approximately U.S. $20 per month. In addition, at least one of
the health funds set a ceiling on medication expenses for the chronically
ill.
It is important to note that the right to services from the sick fund is not
conditional on payment of health insurance fees. The tax is collected by
an independent State agency (the National Insurance Institute, which is
in charge of social security). Non-payment or arrears in payment of the
tax do not discharge the sick fund from its duty to provide services."
5. Consumer Rights
There are several provisions in the Law that address various aspects of
consumer rights, including the duty of the sick funds to have bylaws
stipulating the rights of their members, and a guarantee of the represen-
tation of consumers in two statutory decision-making bodies: by election
to the directorate councils of the sick funds, and by appointment to the
National Health Insurance Council (known as the Health Council).39 It is
worth noting, too, that the law mandates appropriate representation of
women in the Health Council, considering that there is a gender disparity
in health needs, that women often provide health care to family members,
and that they are a majority of the personnel employed in the health sector.
The Law also provides various mechanisms for examination of consumer
complaints and resolution of disputes between insured and insurer,
including the appointment of a special government official as Complaints
Commissioner.
37. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 14(c)(1) as am. by The National Health
Insurance (Amendment No. 2) Law, 1994, 5755 Sefer HaChukim 50 (now ss. 14(c)(2) and
14(e)(1)).
38. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 2 1(b).
39. The Health Council is empowered, among other things, to advise the Minister of Health
on changes in the basket of health services on the promotion of equality in the quality,
availability and accessibility of health services on normative, moral and ethical issues; and on
orders of priority in the use of resources for various needs: ibid., s. 52.
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IV. Implementation: the Legal Legacy of Learning by Doing
Despite the noble intentions of The National Health Insurance Law,
1994, it has raised a new set of problems for policy makers to address. The
following discussion of amending legislation considers these issues.
1. Activating National Health Insurance - The First and Second
Amendments
The first two amendments to the Law dealt with its operationalization.
The Law was passed in June 1994 and came into effect on January 1,
1995. In its original version, it was to become operational together with
prospective legislation that would provide for payment of a "welfare tax"
to trade unions.4 This was necessary to overcome opposition to the Law
from the General Labour Federation, because of the loss of revenue
entailed by the new scheme. Previously, fees for membership in the Klalit
sick fund were paid together with union membership fees, and the Labour
Federation would allocate a certain percentage of the revenues to the sick
fund. Under the Law the health tax was to be paid independently to a
governmental agency, the National Insurance Institute, and this meant, at
the very least, a severely reduced cash flow for the Labour Federation. In
addition, the statutory guarantee of choice in sick fund membership gave
rise to concerns about possible abandonment of the Klalit sick fund and
diminished numbers of trade union members.
These concerns proved to be unfounded over time, and the welfare tax
was never enacted.41 In any event, the connection between The National
Health Insurance Law, 1994 and another as yet unenacted statute was
unprecedented as a legislative technique. The first amendment to the Law
was thus needed to set a concrete date for it to come into effect: 1 January
1995.42
The second amendment to the Law dealt with various technical details
necessary to operationalize the new scheme. 43 During the legislative
process many administrative matters were delegated to the discretion of
40. An attempt on behalf of one of the sick funds to establish a new trade union so as to benefit
from the welfare tax was recently struck down by the Supreme Court. HC 7029/95 General
Labour Federation v. National Labour Court (unreported, 27 February 1997).
41. Among other reasons, there was a legal objection to such legislation, since state support
of trade unions by means of an earmarked tax was considered to be a violation of the principle
of freedom of association and the autonomy of the trade unions.
42. The National Health Insurance (Ainendmient No. 1) Law, 1994, 5755 Sefer HaChukkim
43 (20 December 1994).
43. The National Health Insurance (Amendnent No. 2) Law, 1994,5755 Sefer HaChukkim
50 (28 December 1994).
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the executive and left to be worked out through secondary legislation by
the relevant ministries and government agencies (health, finance, welfare
and social security). Regulations prepared for implementation of the Law
covered many diverse areas, including matters pertaining to registration
of members with sick funds ,4 rates and methods of payment of the health
tax by different categories of insured persons , 45 the "capitation" formula
for allocation of revenues among the sick funds 46 and time schedules for
the transfer of funds.47 In the process of working out the operational
details it became apparent that certain statutory amendments were
necessary so as to fine-tune the Law in actual practice.
The Law itself contained a three-year transition period during which
the basic basket of services would be made completely uniform across the
sick funds. Even at this early point, in the fall of 1994, it was already clear
that regulations regarding supplementary insurance were needed, but
controversial. This remains a major unresolved issue of equality in the
health system. The policy of the Law was to define an extremely
comprehensive basket. At the same time, under the pressure of a lobby
that objected to the so-called "nationalization" of the sick funds, and
advocated some measure of free economic activity to encourage compe-
tition among them, the Law provided that a sick fund may, for a fee,"offer
its members insurance for the financing of additional health services
which are not included in the basket of health services."48 Despite the fact
that the Law empowered the Minister of Health, with approval of a
parliamentary committee, to enact secondary legislation on this matter,
none has appeared. The controversy is due to the concern that supplemen-
tary insurance will create two classes of sick fund members with two
standards of health care, and that there will be a diversion of funds
earmarked for the universal scheme to the supplementary. Opponents of
supplementary insurance argue that it should remain in the province of
44. The National Health Insurance (Registration in Sick Fund and Transferal Procedures)
Regulations, 1995, 5755 Kovetz Takanot 490.
45. The National Health Insurance (Exemption from Payment of Health Tax) Regulations,
1995,5755 Kovetz Takanot 557; The National Health Insurance (Exemption from Payment of
Health Tax to Residents of Institutions) Regulations, 1995, 5755 Kovetz Takanot 557; The
National Health Insurance (Reduced Rates of Health Tax) Regulations, 1995, 5755 Kovetz
Takanot 558; The National Health Insurance (Special Instructions for Payment of Health Tax
Regulations), 1995, 5755 Kovetz Takanot 558.
46. The National Health Insurance (Allocation to Sick Funds) Regulations, 1995, 5755
Kovetz Takanot 493.
47. he National Health Insurance (Deduction of Cost of Serious Illnesses) Regulations, 1995,
5755 Kovetz Takanot 492; The National Health Insurance (Distribution of Revenues) Regu-
lations, 1995, 5755 Kovetz Takanot 652.
48. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 10(a).
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private insurance companies rather than pollute the public system of
health care delivery. Meanwhile, sick funds are in fact offering supple-
mentary insurance schemes to their members, for a fee, but the practice
is not regulated under The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 nor the
general laws regulating the insurance industry.
There were already at this time signs of controversy over whether the
amounts budgeted for the basic basket were sufficient. Under section 9 of
the Law, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Health were to decide
jointly upon "the cost of the basket" at the time the Law came into effect.
This figure was to reflect the legal obligation of the state treasury to
finance the national health insurance system over and above revenues
from the health tax, the parallel tax and other monetary sources men-
tioned in the Law. The legislature had stipulated expressly that this figure
should not be less than the 1993 expenditures of the sick funds and the
Ministry of Health for services included in the basic basket, and that it
would be updated annually by a special "cost of health index," the
components of which were set out in the Fifth Schedule of the Law.49 The
Ministers, however, were not able to reach any agreement on the cost of
the basket until one year later, when the Law called for the first update of
the amount.
Despite these difficulties, the law was put into effect as scheduled.
Overhaul of any large social system can be planned only to a point, and
then societies must depend on their policy making institutions to cope
with implementation. Unanticipated problems and by-products, as well
as opportunities, need to be addressed.
2. Universality and the Definition of Entitlement - The Third
Amendment
The third amendment to the Law illustrates this proposition. While the
Law eliminated political linkages of the health system to the Labour
Federation and to Labour Party politics, links to other policy arenas could
not be avoided. Implementing the notion of universal coverage for all
residents required a definition of residency. This issue became bound up
with the politics of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Under s. 1 of the Law,
residency was defined to comport with its definition for the purposes of
the social security law, which adopts a test of the centre of one's life. The
implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords at the end of 1994
49. The component factors are: wages in the health sector and in the general public sector, the
cost-of-living index, the cost of pharmaceuticals, and the cost of construction. An ongoing
issue is that no account is taken of the cost of technology, and of the aging of the population.
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required clarification of social security entitlements -and hence of health
insurance entitlements - as regards Israeli nationals living in the occupied
territories. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 was thus amended
for the third time on December 28, 1994 as a side-effect of the legislation
that implemented the peace accords in domestic law , 50 so as to include in
the scope of universal health insurance entitlement Israeli residents of the
territories, while excluding Palestinian residents. Interestingly enough,
the Ministry of Health was not even apprised of this amendment until
after the fact.
The status of East Jerusalem Arabs who had moved to suburbs now
under territorial jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority is now at stake.
While many of them had been dues-paying members of sick funds in the
past, the amendment to the law now defined them as outside its scope
because they were no longer resident in East Jerusalem, despite the fact
that the centre of their economic and public activity continued to be there.
This could be viewed as an economic move intended to limit the liability
of the government under the Law, but also could be perceived, even if not
intended as such, as part of a policy to question the residency status of East
Jerusalem Palestinians.5' Almost any contact by such persons with Israeli
public authorities, including with hospitals and sick funds, instigates an
active examination of their actual residence. This in itself might not be
untoward except that the examination usually entails the suspension of
their entitlements. Once residency status is lost, it is almost impossible for
all practical purposes to regain it. The definition of residency also
excludes migrant workers and illegal aliens from national health insur-
ance coverage, despite the fact that due to their special circumstances
vulnerable groups such as these are likely to be in need of the system.52
3. The Government as Provider of Services - The Fourth Amendment
The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 was based on the vision of a
comprehensive, integrated basket of services to be provided by the sick
50. Amendment No. 3 to the Law was enacted within The Implementation of the Agreement
Regarding the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Economic Arrangements and Other Provi-
sions) (Legislative Amendments) Law, 1994, 5755 Sefer HaChukim 66.
51. The Silent Transfer: Denial of Residency Status to Palestinians in East Jerusalem
(Jerusalem: B'Tselem Information Center for Human Rights, 1997) (Hebrew).
52. There are approximately 100,000 legal migrant workers in Israel, and estimates suggest
at least an equal number of illegal workers. Following the death of a male workerfrom apparent
neglect of a treatable health condition in August 1997, the Forensic Medicine Institute
published data according to which 18 deaths of migrant workers (from a total of 51 deaths in
the first eight months of 1997) had occurred as a result of "illnesses and heavy drinking."
Ha'Aretz (Tel Aviv) (27 August 1997).
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funds. Mother-child, psychiatric and geriatric services were to be trans-
ferred from government to the sick funds over an unspecified period of
time, but this has proven impossible so far. Out of fear that the sick funds'
economic considerations would result in the reduction of services, the
Law was amended to ensure that the State continues to be fully respon-
sible for providing mother-child health care. Just over one year after the
Law came into effect, it was amended for the fourth time, so that
responsibility for mother-child services would remain with the Minister
of Health.53 Government employees working in this sector were unhappy
with the prospect of being transferred to the sick funds. In response to
these pressures, and perhaps since these services were one area in which
the Ministry of Health successfully combined regulatory and operational
responsibilities with effective outreach to almost the entire population,
the Law was amended so that mother-child services remain the respon-
sibility of government.
At the same time, the transfer of psychiatric and geriatric services to
the responsibility of the sick funds is being delayed for similar reasons.
On the one hand, there is concern that it will result in a lowering of the
quality of services provided to the most needy and vulnerable. On the
other hand, the sick funds are reluctant to accept responsibility for these
services within the existing governmental budget framework. Several
administrative attempts (including setting actual target dates and enact-
ing secondary legislation of questionable validity 4 ) have been made to
transfer psychiatric services to the sick funds.5 The sick funds have
53. The National Health Insurance (Amendnent No. 4) Law, 1996,5756 Sefer HaChukkimn
253. See also supra note 35.
54. An attempt was made to transfer responsibility from the government to the sick funds by
means of an order issued by the Minister of Health under s. 69 of the Law: The National Health
Insurance (Changing the Second and Third Schedules) Order, 1995, 5755 Kovetz Takanot
1459. The Order was later withdrawn without any explanation: The National Health Insurance
(Changing the Second and Third Schedules) (Annulinent) Order, 1996, 5757 Kovetz Takanot
79. The question of validity stems from the view that such an important administrative action
cannot be taken without some public debate in the legislature, either by means of primary
legislation that would amend the schedules to the Law which set out the services included in
the basket within the respective responsibilities of the sick funds and the government, or by
regulations that require approval by a parliamentary committee. In the fifth amendment to the
Law there was an attempt to clarify the legal procedure for transferral of responsibility from
the government to the sick funds, which would require a decision of the Minister of Health, the
consent of the Minister of Finance and approval of the Cabinet, on the basis of which the
schedules would be amended.
55. M. Mark et al., "From the Netanyahu Report Until the National Health Insurance Law -
Implementation of the Reform in the Mental Health Area in Israel" (1996) 16 Khevra
U'Revakha 185 (Hebrew).
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repeatedly expressed reticence over the idea. The issue has been confused
by other agendas of reform including deinstitutionalization of long-term
hospitalized mentally ill persons, and the matter of independent, finan-
cially accountable management of mental health hospitals. In addition,
there are serious questions as to the responsibility and capacity for
providing community-based services to the mentally ill and those in need
of psycho-therapeutic interventions. Some mental health advocates ar-
gue that the mentally ill constitute a vulnerable group who will not fare
well under a system of capitated, competing sick funds.56
Finally, geriatric long-term care continues to be provided by the
government within seriously limited resources that do not answer actual
needs. As a result, a strong market has developed in supplementary long-
term nursing care insurance 7.5 The existence of this market will only
make transfer of long-term care to the sick fund basket more difficult,
since those now relying on supplementary and private insurance, or
paying directly out-of-pocket, would then be entitled to receive services
at no cost under the National Health Insurance. There is no obvious source
of revenue with which to finance adequately this anticipated demand. At
the same time, reliance upon supplementary insurance in an area like
geriatrics, which serves the needs of a particularly vulnerable population,
raises the danger of creating a two-tier level of health services.
The relative merits of separating out these services has received much
attention." There is a tradeoff between the coordination and continuity
of care which would be anticipated from combining these services with
acute care, and the concern that mother-child, psychiatric and geriatric
care are related to vulnerable groups unable to fend for themselves in a
competitive environment. Given the doubts, it was almost inevitable that
the comprehensive vision of the law would give way to maintaining the
status quo regarding these changes.
56. U. Aviram, "Mental Health Services in Israel at a Crossroads: promises and pitfalls of
mental health services in the context of the New National Health Insurance" (1996) 19 Int'l J.
of Law & Psychiatry 327. See also G. Shefler, "Implementing the Reform of Community
Mental Health Services: Danger, Threat and Opportunity" (1995) 9 Dialogue 151 (Hebrew).
See also W. van de Ven & F.T. Schut, "Should Catastrophic Risks Be Included in a Regulated
Competitive Health Insurance Market?" (1994) 39 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1459.
57. R. Gross & S. Bramli, Supplemental and Commercial Health Insurance in Israel-1996
(Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale Institute, 1996) at 48 (Hebrew).
58. H. Palti, "The National Health Insurance Law - Implications for Preventive Mother-Child
Health Services" (1996)47 Bitakhon Sotziali 80 (Hebrew). See van de Ven & Schut, supra
note56.
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4. Ministry of Finance Control - The Fifth Amendment
Israel's annual budget cycle is accompanied by a special law - the
Arrangements in the State Economy Law - which is intended to enact the
legislative amendments that are necessary for accomplishing budgetary
objectives. This omnibus law is a collection of seemingly unrelated
provisions which deal ad hoc with various budgetary items by amending
the relevant statutes. For example, in contemplation of the 1997 budget,
this Law amended inter alia statutes regulating capital investments, the
ports authority, income tax, insurance, and local government authorities.
Many of the provisions in the economic arrangements law are complex
and not readily transparent in any kind of public debate. As a result of its
broad and diverse scope, the bill is discussed by the finance committee of
the parliament, rather than by the committees to which the various matters
would normally be referred (e.g., in matters of health, the normal forum
would be the labour and welfare committee). The bill is presented to the
parliament two or three months before the end of the budgetary year.
There is pressure to enact its provisions within a time frame that is much
shorter than in the normal legislative process, since the government
budget cannot be approved without it. As a legislative tool, it is designed
to meet a limited practical purpose, and is not intended to be used for
making major changes that are not strictly required by the budget.
Nonetheless, in 1996 this technique was used to enact an extensive
amendment to The National Health Insurance Law, 1994.59 This fifth
amendment to the Law included several noteworthy provisions.
First, it eliminated the "parallel tax" that had been paid by employers
and earmarked for the health system for over twenty years. The parallel
tax accounted for a substantial portion of the health system budget and
was collected and then transferred on a monthly basis to the sick funds.'
The elimination of this tax was sought by the Ministry of Finance in order
to reduce labour costs and compensate employers for cuts in government
subsidies for employment. Apparently, the change left the employers
unaffected, as subsidies were reduced by the amount they previously paid
for the parallel tax. For the Ministry of Finance, however, the shift
eliminated an earmarked tax and a regular source of cash flow to the sick
funds. To be sure, the Ministry is still obligated to ensure the availability
of funds to cover the "cost of the basket." In that respect, however, the
fifth amendment to the Law introduced another significant change.
59. The Arrangements in the State Economy (Statutory Amendments to Meet the Budget
Goals for the Year 1997) Law, 1996,5797 Sefer HaChukim 16.
60. Chinitz, supra note 9.
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The Law had originally intended that the "cost of the basket" would be
determined once, when the Law came into effect, and thereafter updated
annually according to the cost-of-health index. Legislators had been
concerned to establish a fixed statutory obligation of the state treasury to
finance the national health insurance system. However, the fifth amend-
ment to the Law established two new figures as the "cost of the basket"
for 1996 and 1997. Whatever the reasons for this ,61 the effect is to re-open
for annual negotiation or bargaining the extent of the government's
financial obligation under the Law. Furthermore, it also introduced a
distinction between the cost of the basket for the sick funds, which is
supposed to be updated according to the cost-of-health index, and the cost
of the basket for the services provided by the government, for which there
is no updating mechanism. These measures decrease the extent of the
treasury's statutory obligation to cover the costs of the National Health
Insurance scheme, and increase its leeway within the annual state budget
bargaining process.
Moreover, the fifth amendment also extended governmental control
over the financial management of the sick funds. Previously, the Minister
of Health had enacted regulations that imposed detailed accounting and
reporting requirements on the sick funds . 62 These regulations had been
modelled on those applying to companies on the stock exchange. The
theory was that the sick funds should be accountable to the government
and to their members in much the same way as companies are to their
stockholders. The latest amendment to the Law went beyond this and
enacted detailed provisions that pertain to control of the sick fund. In
addition to vesting in the Minister of Health and the Minister of Finance
powers of review over the sick funds' by-laws and their development
budgets, as well as imposing various restrictions on their financial
61. One reason is that the fifth amendment to the Law also reinstated the maternity scheme
that had been in effect prior to its enactment. Maternity insurance had been part of the social
security system, and there had been an efficient method of accounting between the hospitals
and the National Insurance Institute. The new health law, however, had envisaged an
integration of all primary care services in the sick funds and had thus included maternity
services within the basic basket. This meant that the money earmarked for maternity services
was allocated by the National Insurance Institute among the sick funds according to the
capitation formula, and the hospitals now had to settle their accounts, like other hospital
services, with the sick funds. The commentary to the bill for Amendment No. 5 (5757 Hatza 'ot
Chok 13) explains that the experience under the new arrangement indicated that the previous
scheme of direct payment to the hospitals was "more efficient and more just as regards the
allocation of resources." Certainly the old maternity scheme guaranteed an independent cash
flow to the maternity wards of the hospitals.
62. The National Health Insurance (Financial Control and Supervision of the Sick Funds)
Regulations, 1995, 5756 Kovetz Takanot 323.
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activities and holdings, the new amendment would allow the appoint-
ment of an "accompanying accountant" to a sick fund operating under a
deficit budget. This clearly anticipated future developments. As the
three-year transition period of the new Law nears its end, it appears that
the system is indeed operating under a deficit that is estimated as ranging
between 7 and 14 percent of a total budget of approximately 14 billion
New Israeli Shekels.
The result of these changes is that general treasury revenue has become
even more important as a source for financing the health system, with
potentially more Ministry of Finance control over the management of the
sick funds. This outcome demonstrates once again the important linkage
between health policy and other policy arenas, and how the overall vision
of a guaranteed health budget can give way to a very different outcome;
namely, making health finance, and with it access to health services,
contingent on Ministry of Finance budgetary policies.
V. Unresolved Dilemmas - The Cost of Technology
While the politics of the budgetary process may have created some
uncertainty about the guarantee of an adequate health budget, the avail-
ability of new technologies creates pressures to expand the basic basket
of benefits, and increases its cost. The National Health Insurance Law,
1994 includes an elaborate procedure for updating the basic basket of
services with additions and subtractions. This has been well described
elsewhere,63 and its utilization to date provides additional insights into
the implementation process, while it raises the most serious question
challenging health systems in all countries - the scope of entitlement
within limited resources.
According to the Law, services from the initial basket may be cut only
with agreement of the parliamentary Labour and Welfare Committee.
Services may be added by the Minister of Health, with the consent of the
Minister of Finance and approval of the cabinet, only if the two Ministers
can guarantee a source of finance for the additions. With respect to drugs,
the Law provides that the Minister of Health shall publish in an order the
list of the drugs included in the basket of services and the sums of
copayment ,6 and that he may amend the order provided that the amend-
63. D. Chinitz & A. Israeli, "Health Reform and Rationing in Israel" (1997) 16:5 Health
Affairs 205.
64. The National Health Insurance (Drugs in the Health Services Basket) Order 1994,5754
Kovetz Takanot 749.
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ment would not add to the cost of the basket.65 Almost immediately after
activation of the Law, pressure ensued to add new benefits in the form of
new drug therapies. The prominent example concerned Interferon-beta,
a drug therapy for multiple sclerosis.
In the summer of 1995, a group of patients represented by a tenacious
attorney initiated court proceedings in a series of cases, demanding that
the cost of the new treatment -approximately U.S. $20,000 per year for
each patient - be covered by the sick funds. At that time, the use of the
pharmaceutical for the proposed indications had not yet been checked for
safety and efficacy, and had thus not been registered by Israel's Drug
Administration. It thus seemed evident that the case could not succeed,
since the drug was not legally available in the country, and the court did
not have the power to circumvent the statutory procedure for adding drugs
to the coverage. 66 Nonetheless, despite strong treasury objection, the
drug was eventually included in the basket.
First, the Drug Administration was pressured to speed up its evaluation
and approve the drug. Then, one of the sick funds began capitulating to
individual patient pressure, which gave rise to a claim of discrimination
on behalf of all the other patients.67 Finally, in the course of one of the
court proceedings, the Minister of Health forced the hand of the Minister
of Finance, and paved the way for Cabinet approval to include the drug
in the national health system.68 The court ordered the sick fund respon-
dents to provide and finance the drug immediately, and the state to pay the
litigation costs of the plaintiffs. The judge commented on "a fairly
substantiated sense that the filing of the claims and applications before us
today hastened the discussions in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry
of Finance, and brought about the registration of the drug in Israel and its
inclusion in the basket of drugs under the Order".69
65. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 8(G). The Minister is to notify the Knesset
Labour and Welfare Committee of the order, and the Committee has power of review within
14 days of its notification.
66. Case 3-2179/95 Yehudit Rabin v. Leumit Sick Fund and the State of Israel (Tel Aviv
Labour Court) - application for interim relief dismissed for lack of grounds for apparent
entitlement to the final relief.
67. Case 14-1562/95 Daniela Eldar v. Klalit Sick Fund and the State of Israel (Tel Aviv
Labour Court) (unreported, 17 August 1995) - plaintiff awarded interim relief obligating the
sick fund to finance half of the cost of the drug against a bank guarantee, pending clarification
of the principal claim.
68. The National Health Insurance (Drugs in the Health Services Basket) (Amendment)
Order, 1996, 5756 Kovetz Takanot 502.
69. Case 7-2,7-4,7-5,4-179/96 Dorit Shirman and others v. Klalit Sick Fund and others (Tel
Aviv Labour Court) (unreported, 18 January 1996).
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However, after publication of the order to include the drug in the
basket, the Ministry of Health formulated an administrative rider limiting
access to the new drug to patients fitting certain clinical guidelines. A
petition to the High Court of Justice, seeking to annul the administrative
guidelines on grounds of ultra vires, inadequate expert evidence, proce-
dural flaws and unreasonableness, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
and the petitioners were referred to the Labour Court as the court of
exclusive jurisdiction under the Law.7° In a subsequent claim to the
Jerusalem Labour Court,one of the sick funds was obligated by an interim
order to supply the drug to the plaintiff on the basis of a physician's
prescription, and in disregard of the clinical guidelines. The judge stated
that it was not clear who had issued the guidelines and by virtue of what
authority, and expressed doubts as to whether any authority was empow-
ered to restrict the right of a patient to receive a drug included in the basket
on budgetary grounds.7 However, the final judgment of the court
dismissed the claim and upheld the clinical guidelines, which appeared
to conform with the permitted uses of the drug as indicated under its
registration. The court stated that it could not order a public body to
supply a drug prescribed for use in conditions that did not meet those of
its registered indications. One year later, and a month before the decision
on the appeal pending in the National Labour Court, the Minister of
Health published a new order amending the pharmaceutical basket, with
an attached appendix entitled "instructions for use". 2
On considering the appeal, the National Labour Court decided it could
not discuss the validity of the new instructions since the matter had not
been argued at first instance. Since all the appellants had received
assurances from their sick funds that they would continue to receive the
drug as before on a personal basis, and the new instructions allowed for
this with respect to patients receiving sick fund funding for the treatment
prior to their coming into effect, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on
the question of whether instructions for use are, in principle, valid.
73
Since it appears, as a matter of fact, that they do not duplicate the
registered indications of the drug, but are more restrictive with regard to
70. HCJ 2570,2743,3293,3179/96 Medina Bat-Ami and others v. Ministry of Health and
others (unreported, 14 May 1996).
71. Case 7-15,7-16/96 Yossi Barazani and others v. Ministry of Health and others (Jerusalem
Labour Court) (unreported, 22 May 1996).
72. The National Health Insurance (Drugs in the Health Services Basket) (Amendment)
Order, 1997, 5757 Kovetz Takanot 887.
73. Case 9-205,7-2/97 Medina Bat-Ami and others v. Ministry of Health and others (National
Labour Court) (unreported, 9 July 1997).
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its inclusion in the basket of drugs and the financing duty of the sick funds,
the question of the source of the power of the Minister of Health to issue
restrictive clinical guidelines remains open.
The litigation over additional new drugs for multiple sclerosis contin-
ues 74 and new debates arise as to the addition of new drug therapies for
other illnesses (including schizophrenia, HIV/AIDS, breast cancer, and
osteoporosis). While it is too early to draw conclusions from these
isolated cases, it is clear that defining the basket results in complex
interactions among political, legal, economic, medical, and scientific
factors. Those involved in designing the national health insurance scheme
could scarcely have anticipated how the processes set in motion by the
Law would deal with the challenge of setting priorities in the context of
a defined basic basket of services.
VI. Discussion
Israel's National Health Insurance Law, 1994 is based on several key
concepts: social justice in the finance of health care; universal and equal
access to a comprehensive and integrated basket of services; and a
regulated competitive market for the provision of health services. As with
any structural overhaul of a major social system, unanticipated problems
and by-products have emerged during the implementation stage. Sequen-
tial alterations in the sources and amounts of finance raise the spectre of
a two-tiered health system. Failure to integrate the full array of services
into the sick fund basket raises doubts about the wisdom of pursuing such
integration and about equitable treatment of different classes of citizens
seeking access to varying categories of health care. Central government
control over sick fund management raises questions about the vitality of
regulated competition in the sick fund market.
Indeed, Israel has provided a laboratory of sorts for learning about
managed competition. Some analysts have labelled the latter an oxymo-
ron.,75 while others have noted that the elegance of Enthoven's theory
militates against its adoption by policy makers, who are typically adverse
74. HCJ 2696/97 Oliver Riva v. Minister of Health and others (unreported, 6 May 1997) -
petition to receive Avonex dismissed as being premature; case 14-1544/97 Lily Carmel v.
Klalit Sick Fund (Tel Aviv Labour Court) (unreported, 10 August 1997) - sick fund ordered to
provide and fund immunoglobolin for patient not meeting the registered uses of the drug, on
basis of special prescription and opinion of treating physician.
75. T. R. Marmor, "Changing Conditions for Healthcare Management, or Hopes and
Hyperbole: The Rhetoric and Reality of Managerial Reform in Health Care," keynote address
at Conference on Changing Management in Health Care: New Missions,Conditions and Skills,
European Health Care Association, Den Hague, June 1997.
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to overly complex proposals.7 6 Either way, few underestimate the chal-
lenge involved in trying to implement the theory of managed competi-
tion. As Evans has argued, it is unlikely that markets can totally supplant
public management in health care, though competitive mechanisms may
be a tool of management in public systems.77 The question is one of
balance between management and competition. In theory, managed
competition implies a very particular way of striking this balance which,
as noted, has never been implemented in full. Since the Israeli case comes
as close as any other to this model, it is suggestive about the tradeoff
between management and competition. While only three years have
elapsed since the new law came into effect, the implementation process
has been extremely dynamic, and even as this article is being written
changes in the law are under review and will be alluded to in the following
discussion.
In Israel it appears that the "managed" definitely outweighs the
"competition." The National Health Insurance Law, 1994 itself bars
price competition among the funds, at least for provision of the basic
basket. The sick funds cannot compete on price, reducing their incentive
to add services to the standardized basket. The sick funds do advertise
heavily to try to attract new members, but this has been a controversial
expenditure of scarce resources and has come under considerable public
criticism. The competition among the funds does not seem to be the type
of competition envisioned by the Law because it is overly aggressive, has
been tainted by cases of misrepresentation in the recruitment of new
members, and often is focused almost entirely on the supplementary
insurance. One overall result is the apparently limited movement of
consumers among sick funds,78 with about four percent of the population
9witching funds annually. Another is an increasing sense that, at least
with regard to the basic basket, there is little to choose from among the
sick funds.79 On the positive side, there is evidence that most of the public
feel that service levels have remained the same or improved, though it is
not clear if these improvements took place largely before the new Law
went into effect, since the data is from mid- 1995.8° One clear effect of the
76. L.D. Brown, "Knowledge And Power: Health Services Research as a Political Resource"
in E. Ginzburg, ed., Health Services Research (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1991) at 33.
77. R. G. Evans, "Going for Gold: The Redistributive Agenda Behind Market Based Health
Care Reform" in Chinitz & Cohen, supra note 5.
78. A. Berg et al., Public Perceptions of the Health System Following Implementation of the
National Health Insurance Law: Principal Findings from a Survey of the General Population
(Jerusalem: JDC/Brookdale Institute, 1997) at 17 (Hebrew).
79. Objective - the Consumer Magazine of Israel (August 1997) at 38-43 (Hebrew).
80. A. Berg et al., supra note 78, at 69.
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competition introduced by the law has been increased access for Arab
minority populations living in remote areas, due to the opening of new
clinics by sick funds seeking to attract new members.8
There have been no new entrants into the sick fund market. This may
be explained in part by the criteria for recognition of a new sick fund under
the regulations, 82 including the statutory requirements that a sick fund
must invest all its profits to meet the purposes set down in its articles of
incorporation, that it may not give out dividends to its members or
shareholders, and that on its liquidation the remaining assets are to be
devoted to a similar purpose." The apparent primary candidates for entry
into this market are for-profit private insurance firms. Current proposals
of the Ministry of Finance apparently include allowing private insurers to
obtain sick fund status, provided they do not engage in underwriting or
cream-skimming and undertake to provide the standard service basket.
Still, those opposed to entrance of private entities into the sick fund
market appear to base their opposition on the fact that private insurers
would be paying dividends to investors.84
The basic basket of services mandated by the law has proven another
aspect of managed competition easier to "declare" at the outset than to
maintain and deal with over time.85 As described above, it has proven
extremely difficult to update the basket. This is, of course, connected
quite closely to the budgeting process and the continuing deficits which
81. Supra note 28.
82. Supra note 13. For example, rule 1(2) of The National Health Insurance (Recognition of
Sick Funds) Regulations requires a corporation seeking recognition as a sick fund to show a
capital investment of approximately U.S. $12 million over a period of three years, and rule 3
requires that it show an intended membership of 35,000 at the time of application for
recognition, with a forecast of 80,000 members within three years.
83. The National Health Insurance Law, 1994, s. 25(1).
84. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv) (9 September 1997) quoting the Director of the Klalit Sick Fund.
85. Other systems, in places such as Oregon, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, have also
gone down the path of trying to define an explicit basic basket of services. In Oregon, a basket
of services (applicable only to the Medicaid population) was determined based on cost-benefit
analysis relying in part on surveys of public preferences. In New Zealand a Core Services
Committee recommended that rather than exclude whole areas of service from public
coverage, guidelines should be developed to set priorities within service areas. For further
discussion of these examples, see Flood paper, this volume. Finally, in the Netherlands, a
Commission laid out a set of criteria for setting priorities, but it has been used sparingly in
cutting services from the basket, fo: example, reducing the number of in vitro fertilizations to
which couples may have access, and imposing limits on physiotherapy sessions. It should be
remembered that in the Dutch case the priorities are only for the public basket and much of the
public is insured outside this plan, at least for now: See Schut & Hermans paper, this volume,
and World Health Organization, European Health Care Reforms: Analysis of Current
Strategies (World Health Organization, 1997). Thus, of all these examples, Israel appears to
be the only one with a detailed basket, explicitly including and excluding services, applied
universally in concert with managed competition.
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have carried over from the previous system. As the bill for the health care
system has been laid at the door of the Ministry of Finance, the latter has
entered into the realm of the actual scope of health services included in
the basic basket, which it previously appeared happy to leave to others,
such as the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Finance is seeking to solve
the budgetary problem by suggesting cutbacks in the basic basket of
services, or by eliminating the basic basket from the law and allowing
each sick fund to determine its own basket. The Finance Ministry is
discovering, however, that it is as difficult to eliminate services from the
basket as to update the latter by adding new services. Services which
would be removed from the basic basket would find their way, one way
or another, into the supplementary policies of the sick funds. This is likely
to encounter serious opposition because of the concern about a two-tiered
system. Since the Ministry of Finance has no grounds to convince the
public that services cut from the basic basket are not essential, overcom-
ing this opposition will be difficult.
The perhaps inadvertent way in which the Ministry of Finance has
implicated itself in the substance of health policy beyond the financial
aspects, might reflect the difficulty of inducing decentralization in a
system with a tradition of centralization. While the law sought to
centralize the financing of the system and decentralize the provision of
services (through transferral of responsibility from the Ministry of Health
to the sick funds), the Ministry of Finance has taken steps which imply
more centralization in both realms. Abandonment of the employer-paid
parallel tax makes finance of the health system even more dependent on
general revenues controlled by the Ministry of Finance. The provision for
government appointment of controllers for the sick funds increases
central control over the sick funds.
In addition, the decentralization of services provision has not taken
place, as reflected by the failure to integrate the preventive (mother and
child), psychiatric and geriatric services into the sick fund basic basket of
services despite the political will of the government to do so. Consumers
of these services, and to a large extent the sick funds themselves, appear
reticent about their integration into a unified basket, especially in view of
the already dismal financial position of the sick funds. While doubts have
been raised in the literature as to the wisdom of such an integration,8 6 in
the Israeli case the failure to integrate adds to the uncertainty regarding
the degree to which the system can be based on competing sick funds.
86. See van de Ven & Schut, supra note 56. See G. Robinson et al., Mental Health in Health
Policy: A Cross-National Comparison (Washington, D.C.: Policy Resource Center and Office
of Technology Assessment, 1994).
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The heavy emphasis on managing the system has, ironically, promoted
activity of the parts of the system providing benefits not concerned with
the basic coverage. Most of the actual competition is over supplementary
insurance, and it has proven difficult for government to promulgate
regulations for this market. This leads to inefficiency and inequity, since
there is no mechanism for determining whether the services offered under
supplementary insurance are worthwhile, and because the supplementary
policies use screens to accept applicants. Until now there appears to be
more screening by health status, than by income or education.87 More-
over, since the supplementary insurance is provided by the sick funds
there is concern that those with such coverage will receive better
treatment. As mentioned, the Ministry of Finance wants to return to the
sick funds the right to levy direct premiums for the basic basket, to open
up the sick fund market to private entities, and to allow sick funds to
determine their own basket of services.
Conclusion
The Israeli case resents an example of managed competition not as an
integrated strategy but as a pendulum swinging between the two alterna-
tives included in the term. Traditional tendencies to centralized manage-
ment give way, at least in policy formulations, to extreme reliance on the
market. The lesson here, perhaps not surprisingly, is that it is difficult to
find a blend of management and competition, of government and market.
However, seen optimistically, the swinging pendulum is part of a dialec-
tic learning process wherein, at some point, a stable point in the middle
might be found.
One missing element in the Israeli case, which may be necessary to
slow down the pendulum, is significant public debate of the issues. The
National Health Council, which was intended by the Law to serve as a
forum for such discussion, has barely been activated. Press reporting of
developments in the health system tends, in sporadic fashion depending
on the budget cycle, to emphasize the polar opposites of public vs. private,
rather than provide an ongoing assessment of the issues.
Much like Pareto optimality in welfare economics, there are many
points along the curve of the pendulum's path which probably would be
preferable to either extreme and to the continual swing between them.88
87. R. Gross & S. Bramli, supra note 57.
88. Pareto optimality is the term used by economists to describe a situation in which no
reallocation of resources will make any individual better off without making at least one other
individual worse off.
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However, finding an equilibrium amounts to establishing a social con-
sensus concerning the issues raised by managed competition- the basket
of services, freedom of choice of provider, the amount of inequity society
is prepared to tolerate. Evans has stressed that health care policy com-
prises a series of conflicts which must be solved politically.89
The lack of a formal process for including public debate in the
decision-making process is very striking as the three-year "interim
period" of the Law comes to its close. Serious structural changes are being
proposed by the Ministry of Finance without any attempt to discuss the
lessons learned from the first three years of the Law's operation, or to find
solutions that would live up to the statutory purpose of social justice,
equality and mutual aid. The pendulum of the managed competition
discourse obscures the implications as to the health rights of the insured.
The ping-pong of late-night bargaining sessions between the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Health civil servants leaves the public
uninformed about matters that do not have any magic solution, but which
affect directly their legal rights to basic health services. The key dilemma
is how to define a core basket of services within budgetary constraints and
limited resources, on the one hand, and increasingly costly technological
innovations, on the other. This is also a key issue in a rights analysis of
the system. Under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the government has a duty to take steps to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieve progressively the full
realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health. Who decides when the
maximum has been reached? How do we share the resources justly and
fairly? And how do we decide on the method of distribution? What is the
process of decision-making, and who is included in it?
The Israeli case suggests that introduction of health reform, especially
through passage of seminal legislation such as The National Health
Insurance Law, 1994, constitutes only the beginning of a political
dynamic concerned with resolving conflicts and dilemmas in the health
care system. It seems that while the law instituted major change,
behavioural patterns linked to the problems which brought the law into
effect still persist: a strong tendency to centralization, linkages of health
policy to other policy areas, inequity, and lack of accountability. Success-
ful policy implementation requires flexible adaptation to the new set of
89. R.G. Evans, "Life and Death, Money and Power: The Politics of Health Care Finance"
in T.J. Litman & L.S. Robins, eds., Health Politics and Policy (Albany: Delmar, 1991) at 287-
301.
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issues that arises and a realistic appraisal of whether responsive policy
mechanisms are in place. Public managers, broadly defined to include the
political leaders of the system, are now confronted with the challenge of
designing institutions capable of resolving the dilemmas which the
reform process has brought into sharper focus.
